Reputation and Character in Defamation Actions by Ehrhardt, Charles W.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 64 
Issue 3 Time, Property Rights, and the Common Law 
1986 
Reputation and Character in Defamation Actions 
Charles W. Ehrhardt 
Florida State University 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Evidence Commons, and the Torts Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Charles W. Ehrhardt, Reputation and Character in Defamation Actions, 64 WASH. U. L. Q. 867 (1986). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol64/iss3/9 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
REPUTATION AND CHARACTER IN
DEFAMATION ACTIONS
CHARLES W. EHRHARDT*
I. INTRODUCTION
The constitutional limitations imposed upon state defamation laws
have generally involved balancing the state's interest in having a defamed
citizen receive compensation for his wrongfully damaged reputation'
against the public's interest in being fully informed about public officials
and public affairs. The first amendment protects the public's sources of
information concerning government and governmental employees2 and
also protects the news media from self-censorship.3 Because false state-
ments are inevitable in free debate, a defamed public official or public
figure is required to plead and prove that the defendant acted with "ac-
tual" malice; i.e., the defendant published the statement knowing that it
was false or with reckless disregard for the truth.4
Prior to the constitutionalization of defamation law in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan,5 it was generally accepted that under state law all
libels and some slanders were actionable per se. The plaintiff could es-
tablish a cause of action without either pleading or proving that he had
suffered any harm to his reputation. Because of the difficulty in estab-
lishing proof of actual damage, the existence of actual damage was pre-
sumed from the publication of the libel itself in cases where it was "all
but certain that serious harm ha[d] resulted in fact."6 The jury was per-
* Ladd Professor of Evidence, Florida State University, College of Law; B.S. 1962, Iowa
State University; J.D. 1964, University of Iowa. The author would like to thank L. Orin Slagle for
his comments on an earlier version of this Article and Robert Bradshaw for his valuable research
assistance. The author also thanks Talbot D'Alemberte for his substantive suggestions and com-
ments. This Article was supported by a research leave from the Florida State University College of
Law.
1, This characterization of the interest as a state interest first appeared in Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc. 418 U.S. 323, 348 (1974).
2. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2950 (1985) (White,
J., concurring).
3. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 341 (1974).
4. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-72 (1964).
5. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
6. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. at 2946 (1985).
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mitted to award monetary damages for damage to the plaintiff's reputa-
tion, even though no evidence had been introduced to show the existence
or the extent of that damage. These damages were called "presumed
damages." 7
The Supreme Court in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.8 rejected the con-
cept of presumed damages and recognized some first amendment protec-
tion for defamatory speech about persons who are not public officials or
public figures, at least where the statement involves a matter of public
concern. In view of the lessened constitutional interests at stake, the
plaintiff in Gertz was required to prove some minimal fault on the part of
the defendant, such as negligence, and to prove actual damage or injury
to the plaintiff resulting from the defamation. Gertz also restricted puni-
tive damages to cases in which the New York Times actual malice stan-
dard was met.9
The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc. 1o limited the application of prior decisions, and
held that both presumed damages and punitive damages can be recov-
ered even though there has been no showing of "actual malice" when
false statements do not involve a matter of public concern. Because mat-
ters of public concern were not being discussed,11 the plurality opinion
found that the state's interest in compensating private individuals for
damage to their reputations was more important than the constitutional
value of speech that did not involve matters of public concern. t2
Although these Supreme Court decisions have established a number of
constitutional guidelines for balancing the competing interests, they leave
unsettled a variety of issues that frequently arise in the trial of defama-
tion suits. This Article will focus on a number of evidentiary issues relat-
ing to the plaintiff's reputation and character which arise in light of
Gertz and Dun & Bradstreet. Although a public-issue plaintiff must show
7. PROSSER & KEETON, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 112, at 795-96 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
cited as PROSSER].
8. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
9. Id. at 349.
10. 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1984) (Dun & Bradstreet, a credit reporting agency, erroneously informed
five regular subscribers that Greenmoss Builders, a construction contractor, had filed a voluntary
bankruptcy petition; eight days later the recipients were informed of the error).
11. The opinion did not set forth a test to determine whether the publication involved a matter
of public or private interest. The plurality suggested that the courts should examine "the content,
form and context" of the statement; it observed that the fact the credit report was confidential and
circulated to a limited readership supported the conclusion that the matter was private. Id. at 2947.
12. Id. at 2944-46.
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actual injury, there has been little attention given to modem evidentiary
techniques available to either party to accurately show whether any in-
jury occurred. In addition to discussing these methods, this Article rec-
ommends the use of public opinion surveys as a technique for
determining the fact, and measuring the extent, of any reputational dam-
age. Although damages for emotional suffering are recoverable under
Gertz, this Article considers whether a plaintiff should recover under
state defamation law for emotional injury without accompanying proof
of injury to reputation. Asserting that proof of injury to reputation
should be a predicate requirement, the Article analyzes the policies un-
derlying the limitations generally imposed upon recovery for emotional
damages in negligence and other tort actions and recommends their gen-
eral application in defamation actions. With the resurrection of pre-
sumed damages, reputation and character evidence may be offered by
both parties. This Article explores whether the plaintiff may offer evi-
dence of his actual injury while at the same time relying upon the pre-
sumption and considers the types of evidence that may be employed.
Recently in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,"3 the Supreme
Court interpreted the first amendment as requiring a private person to
prove the falsity of a defamatory publication when the statement in-
volved a matter of public concern and the plaintiff sought to recover
damages from a news organization. The truthfulness of the defamatory
statement is likely to be in dispute in most defamatory cases whether the
plaintiff is a public official or a private person. The Article concludes
with a discussion of when reputation and other character evidence is ad-
missible to prove truth or falsity.
II. ACTUAL DAMAGE TO REPUTATION
A. Generally
When a defamatory statement involves a matter of public concern, a
private-person plaintiff, unless he proves actual malice, must introduce
competent evidence to establish actual damage to his reputation, and the
extent of the damage, if he is to recover for that injury." The jury may
13. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986).
14. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974). The private-person plaintiff may
recover presumed damages in this situation if he can prove actual malice. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v.
Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
The possibility of a constitutionally permissible cause of action to declare a defamatory statement
false without the plaintiff seeking to recover damages was suggested in Philadelphia Newspapers,
Number 3]
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not presume either the fact or the amount of the damage.'5 Although
Gertz deferred to the trial courts to frame appropriate jury instructions
defining the elements of compensable damage, the Court specifically in-
cluded within its definition of actual injury "impairment of reputation
and standing in the community, personal humiliation, and mental
anguish and suffering."' 1 6
The Gertz actual injury requirement clearly makes evidence of the
damages caused by the defamation relevant during the plaintiff's case-in-
chief. Thus, when a plaintiff seeks to recover for injury to his reputation,
competent evidence of that damage is admissible during the initial pres-
entation of his case to the jury. In fact, his failure to offer evidence of a
damaged reputation will probably result in the removal of that issue from
the jury, even before the defendant presents his case. Earlier cases that
prohibited the plaintiff from offering such evidence unless his reputation
was attacked are no longer persuasive.1 7
The defendant may also offer evidence relating to the plaintiff's repu-
tation, usually to mitigate the plaintiff's damages. The evidence could
show that the plaintiff's reputation was poor prior to the defamation, and
therefore he did not suffer as much damage as a person with a good
reputation.18 The defendant's evidence might also show that there was a
limited publication of the defamation or that the defamation did not
Inc. v. Hepps, 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986). Footnote four in that case carefully limited the Court's
holding that a private-person plaintiff must prove falsity in order to recover damages from a newspa-
per concerning a statement of public concern: "Nor need we consider what standards would apply if
... a State were to provide a plaintiff with the opportunity to obtain a judgment that declared the
speech at issue to be false but did not give rise to liability for damages." Id. at 1565 n.4.
15. See infra text accompanying notes 79-98.
16. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350. The recovery can include damages for the loss of reputation that
endures beyond the end of the lawsuit. See Dixson v. Newsweek, Inc., 562 F.2d 626, 631-32 (10th
Cir. 1977).
17. Some early cases prohibited the plaintiff from introducing evidence of his good character,
unless his character was attacked, on the basis that a person should not be able to prove what the law
presumes. See, e.g., Blakeslee v. Hughes, 50 Ohio St. 490, 34 N.E. 793 (1893); Cooper v. Phipps, 24
Ore. 357, 33 P. 985 (1893). Others permitted the plaintiff to introduce evidence of his good charac-
ter during his case-in-chief if the defendant's answer denied an assertion of good character or
pleaded justification. See, e.g., Sloneker v. Van Ausdall, 106 Ohio St. 320, 140 N.E. 121 (1922). Still
other jurisdictions permitted the plaintiff to introduce evidence of his good character regardless of
what actions the defendant had taken. See, eg., Deitchman v. Bowles, 166 Ky. 285 (1915). Profes-
sor Anderson terms these decisions "obsolete." Anderson, Reputation, Compensation and Proof, 25
WM. & MARY L. REV. 747, 753 (1984).
18. See 1 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 70 (3d ed. 1940) ("[A] person should not be paid for the
loss of that which he never had.") [hereinafter cited as 1 WIGMORE]; PROSSER, supra note 7, at
§ 116A, at 847.
[Vol. 64:867
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cause any injury to reputation because the community did not believe
that the statement was true.
When a plaintiff seeks to recover the actual injury to his reputation, he
is attempting to recover for damage to an element that is based on "the
slow growth of months and years, the resultant picture of forgotten inci-
dents, passing events, habitual and daily conduct" 9 and on the general
discussions and comment concerning a person in the community.20 The
evidence offered by the plaintiff must reflect this composite description of
what the people in a community have said and are saying about the
plaintiff.2" The personal knowledge and belief of a single person do not
reflect the community's evaluation of reputation;22 nor does the occur-
rence of particular events in the life of an individual.23
Generally only evidence of the plaintiff's actual reputation is admissi-
ble. The concern is with what the plaintiff's reputation is, not what it
19. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 477 (1948), (quoting Badger v. Badger, 88 N.Y.
546, 552 (1882)). Many of the opinions discussing reputation testimony arise either in the context of
proving the character of a victim, a criminal defendant, or a witness. Reputation may be a permissi-
ble method of proving these issues. There are fewer opinions dealing with the method of proving
reputation in defamation cases. However, there is no reason to distinguish many of the general
principles that have been established; they are applicable whenever evidence of a person's reputation
is relevant.
20. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
21. C. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 249 (3d ed. 1984) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK].
Although it seems clear under Gertz that injury to a broad-based reputation is a recoverable element
of damage, the Court's subsequent decision in Dun & Bradstreet, arguably indicates that the damage
need not be among so diverse a group. In that case, the false statement was privately distributed to
five customers ofDun & Bradstreet and there was no indication that any other persons were aware of
it. If only one individual reviewed each report that was mailed, the personal opinion of those five
persons would not be sufficient to establish an individual's reputation because the group holding the
belief would be too narrow. However, without discussion the Court assumed that the damage to the
plaintiff was sufficient. The Court in Dun & Bradstreet may have been approving the continued
vitality of the common-law position that even though harm to reputation did not result, the cause of
action was present if the publication deterred third persons from associating or dealing with the
plaintiff. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559 (1977) [hereinafter cited as RESTATE-
MENT]. On the other hand, it could be argued that Dun & Bradstreet addresses only a defamatory
statement that involves a matter of private concern, and that it is inappropriate to draw an inference
about the type of injury that is compensable under Gertz from its holding that presumed damages
can be recovered in these actions.
The perceived reaction of third persons may also be relevant to the plaintiff's claim for emotional
damage. See Behrendt v. Times-Mirror Co., 85 P.2d 949 (Cal. App. 1938); Lancour v. Herald &
Globe Ass'n, 112 Vt. 471, 477, 28 A.2d 396, 401 (1942), rev'd on other grounds, Lent v. Huntoon,
143 Vt. 539, 549, 470 A.2d 1162, 1170 (1983).
22. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 475, 477 (1948).
23. See Schieffelin v. Hylan, 178 N.Y.S. 652, 659 (N.Y. App. Div. 1919), aff'd, 190 A.D. 903,
179 N.Y.S. 949 (1919); Pfister v. Milwaukee Free Press Co. 139 Wis. 627, 121 N.W. 938 (1909).
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should be.24  Therefore, evidence of specific acts that the plaintiff has
committed is inadmissible when offered by the defendant to mitigate
damages and prove that the plaintiff's reputation was poor before the
defamatory statements were made.25 Unless these actions are known and
discussed by the community they cannot affect reputation. 26 One indi-
vidual's opinion or knowledge is irrelevant; unless it is shared by other
members of the community, it is not reflective of reputation. 7
Reputation, the shared view of a substantial segment of the commu-
nity, is based on hearsay statements which may or may not be true; gos-
sip and rumor may form a part of an individual's reputation. In general,
however, testimony that a certain rumor is being spread throughout a
community will not be admitted2" without additional foundation because
24. See Gobin v. Globe Publishing Co., 232 Kan. 1, 649 P.2d 1239 (1982) (trial court did not
err in excluding evidence of plaintiff's involvement in criminal proceeding when offered to establish
the plaintiff's reputation; however the evidence would be admissible to establish the effect of such
actions upon plaintiff's reputation). In Stone v. Varney, 48 Mass. (7 Met.) 86, 89 (1843) the court
held that a defendant may offer evidence of a plaintiff's bad character on the issue of damages:
[P]ublic reports of the facts stated in the libel were inadmissible as evidence in mitigation of
damages, where a plea in justification had been filed, alleging the truth of the matter stated
in the libel; but they also held that the general character of the plaintiff was put in issue in
an action of slander, without regard to the pleading or notice of defence [sic] on the part of
the defendant. Chief Justice Savage says, "under any circumstances, the defendant may
show that the plaintiff's reputation has sustained no injury, because he had no reputation
to lose."
A few cases, although not addressing the issue directly, apparently admit evidence of the plaintiff's
prior conduct without proof that it affected his reputation; these involve particularly egregious situa-
tions. See, eg., Wynberg v. National Enquirer, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 294, 297 (C.D. Cal. 1982)
("Wynberg's past conduct and criminal convictions establish a bad reputation. .. ").
25. See Butts v. Curtis Publishing Co., 225 F. Supp. 916, 921 (N.D. Ga. 1964), 351 F.2d 702
(5th Cir. 1965) aff'd, 388 U.S. 130, reh'g denied, 389 U.S. 889 (1967); Boyles v. Mid-Florida Televi-
sion Corp., 431 So. 2d 627, 640 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Yager v. Bruce, 116 Mo. App. 473, 493
S.W. 307, 313 (1906); Towle v. St. Albans Publishing Co., 122 Vt. 134, 137, 165 A.2d 363, 366
(1960).
Evidence of specific misdeeds may be offered to show that the plaintiff does not care much about
his reputation and was not humilitated by the publication. Professor Dobbs suggests that the evi-
dence generally should not be admitted for this purpose because of its potential for prejudice and
lack of probative value. D. DoBBs, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 516-17 (1973).
26. When a witness testifies to a person's reputation, he may be asked during cross-examination
if he has heard discussion in the community of factual occurrences such as arrests and rumors that
would not otherwise be admissible. This examination tests the accuracy of the witness' interpreta-
tion of the community's views. See, e.g., Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 477 (1948); Fine
v. State, 70 Fla. 412, 70 So. 379 (1915).
27. Sickra v. Small, 87 Me. 493, 496, 33 A. 9, 10 (1895) (no error in sustaining objection to
question on cross-examination of character witnesses concerning whether they ever saw the plaintiff
commit an immoral act); Crandall v. Greeves, 181 Mo. App. 235, 242, 168 S.W. 264, 267 (1914),
28. Yager v. Bruce, 116 Mo. App. 473, 493, 93 S.W. 307, 313 (1906).
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it does not establish that the community believes the rumor or that the
plaintiff's reputation has been adversely affected. With such a predicate,
however, direct or cross examination concerning these rumors is appro-
priate.29 A minority of jurisdictions have even admitted evidence of ru-
mors concerning the plaintiff's character when the evidence is offered to
mitigate damages. The courts in these jurisdictions have reasoned that
the evidence was probative to show the nature of plaintiff's reputation
prior to the publication; i.e., because these reports were already circulat-
ing in the community, the injury to plaintiff's reputation was not as
great.3°
Evidence establishing injury to reputation may relate to one of two
forms of damage-general or special. Under Gertz, either type of dam-
age is sufficient to state a cause of action. Special damages, those that do
not generally flow from the publication, usually are readily quantifiable
and economic or pecuniary in nature. For example, loss of customers or
employment 3' as a result of the publication is special damage sufficient to
support a cause of action.32  General damages, on the other hand, are
those damages that normally flow from the publication and are antici-
pated when a person's reputation is damaged. Although they seek to
compensate for actual loss, such as loss of a person's good name, general
damages are not easily quantifiable in monetary terms.33
General damages are more frequently alleged. In proving general
29. [C]haracter witnesses are persons who portend to know what is said of another, what
one's reputation is among his friends, neighbors, and associates. Such persons could be
expected to know of one's brushes with the law and the effect, if any, of such instances
upon one's reputation. We conclude that Gobin's conduct on the occasion of his arrests,
and the fact of his trials, the extent of knowledge thereof, and their effect, if any, upon his
reputation, is admissible either in direct or cross-examination of character witnesses.
Golan v. Globe Publishing Co., 620 P.2d 1163, 1166-67 (1980).
30. See Republican Publishing Co. v. Mosman, 15 Colo. 399, 412, 24 P. 1051, 1055-56 (1890)
(current and common report admissible to mitigate; "We must not be understood as indicating that
mere rumor, mere disparaging remarks, or discommendatory statements, sometimes called 'gossip,'
should be considered as mitigating circumstances .. "); Naylor v. Ponder, 15 Del. 408, 41 A. 88
(1895) ("general rumor" admissible in mitigation); See also Morgan v. Lexington Herald Co., 138
Ky. 637, 128 S.W. 1064 (1910) (evidence of rumors admissible in mitigation, but not to show truth
of the defamation); but see I J. WIGMORE, supra note 18, at § 74 ("The better arguments seem to
require the exclusion of such evidence; and this is the result in the great majority of jurisdictions.").
31. PROSSER, supra note 7, at § 112, at 794.
32. See McCormick, Measure of Damages for Reputation, 12 N.C.L. REV. 120, 124-26 (1934),
(emotional distress was not sufficient to result in special damages). See also RESTATEMENT, supra
note 21, at § 575, comment c (unless there are presumed damages or special damages, emotional
injuries are not compensable).
33. PROSSER, supra note 7, at § 116A; RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, at § 575.
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damages, the testimony on reputation relating to either of two time peri-
ods will be probative. Because the evidence is being offered to prove that
the plaintiff's reputation was damaged, the evidence must either relate
1) to the period of time prior to publication of the defamation so that it
can be inferred that the same reputation existed immediately before the
publication,3 4 or 2) to the time period after the publication so that it can
be established that there was damage in fact to the plaintiff's reputation.
There also must be evidence of causation-that the publication of the
defamation was a legal cause of the damage to reputation.3 5
When there is proof that the plaintiff's reputation is damaged through-
out the entire community, the damage element of the cause of action has
been met. However, if the proof establishes only that there has been
damage to the reputation in some discrete portion of the community but
not in the eyes of the community as a whole, the issue arises as to
whether that proof is sufficient to maintain the action. At common law,
if the plaintiff's stature was lowered in the eyes of a "substantial and
respectable minority" of the community, the damage was adequate and
there is no reason to believe that the first amendment cases change this
view.3
6
Rather than offering direct evidence of the damage to his reputation in
the community, the plaintiff may rely upon testimony regarding the reac-
tion of a small number of people. For example, the plaintiff may testify
that after the defamation his friends started looking at him in a strange
way or the frequency of his social invitations declined. This evidence is
probative of the reaction of a few individuals. Plaintiff could rely upon
an inference that the reactions of his friends are the result of their knowl-
edge of the defamatory statement, which lessened their opinion of the
plaintiff. The argument then is that the plaintiff's reputation in the com-
munity may be inferred from the conduct and reaction of these few.
Although there is some authority that supports this argument,3 7 other
courts have generally rejected the ultimate inference of a person's reputa-
34. See Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1079 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 182 (1985) (court considered evidence relating to diminished reputation prior to
November 1978, when the statement was published); Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., 441 Pa. 432,
273 A.2d 899 (1971) (record revealed that "prior to the date of the publication involved," the plain-
tiff's reputation was "substantially tarnished").
35. RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, at §§ 621-623.
36. Id. at § 559.
37. See id. at § 559 (defines defamatory communication as one which "tends to harm the repu-
tation of another as to ... deter third persons from associating or dealing with him").
[Vol. 64:867
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tion in the absence of evidence that those feelings are shared by a broad
cross-section of the community."8 In these cases, the reliability of the
conclusion that the feelings of a few represent the views of the commu-
nity has not been established. Consequently, testimony concerning the
reaction of a few has been rejected as not accurately reflecting the view of
the larger group.3 9
Some disagree whether reputation testimony should be excluded as
hearsay. It has been argued that reputation testimony is hearsay only
when it is offered to prove the truth of the fact reputed such as when
reputation of ownership is offered to prove ownership.4 When injury to
reputation is an element of damage, testimony regarding reputation may
not be hearsay because its value does not rest on the truth of the out-of-
court statements. Rather, out-of-court statements are relevant to the is-
sue of reputation simply because members of the community are making
them. Even if the trial judge finds that this testimony regarding damage
to reputation is hearsay, however, Federal Rule of Evidence 803(21) cre-
ates an exception for reputation evidence about a person's character. A
defamatory statement almost always involves an attack on the plaintiff's
character. Thus, whether or not a judge characterizes the evidence as
hearsay, the hearsay rule will not exclude it.
B. Methods of Proof
In Gertz, the Supreme Court recognized that while all damage awards
must be supported by competent evidence, there need not be evidence
which assigns an actual dollar figure to the injury.4 1 The Federal Rules of
Evidence do not contain a specific provision that establishes a method for
proving reputation or injury thereto. However, the Notes of the Advi-
sory Committee for the Federal Rules indicate that the Committee relied
upon the existing case law to define the appropriate method of proof.4 2
38. Note, Reputation, 46 IOWA L. REV. 426, 426 (1961). See 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§§ 1584-85 (3d ed. 1940).
39. Modem survey techniques make it possible to measure the views of a large number of
persons by studying the views of a small, representative sample. See infra notes 49-76.
40. MCCORMICK, supra note 21, at § 249, n.32.
41. Gertz, 418 U.S. at 350.
42. FED. R. EVID. 405, 608(a) advisory committee notes. Occasionally, suggestions have been
made regarding methods of proving damage to reputation, the acceptability of which today seems
doubtful. See McCormick, Measure of Damages for Reputation, 12 N.C.L. REV. 120, 133 (1934)
(testimony of witnesses who "have heard or read the defamation, as to the impression made on
them" and "testimony as to the change in manner and conduct of the plaintiff's family, friends and
acquaintances toward him"); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 627 F.2d 527, 540 (7th Cir. 1982) (testi-
Number 3]
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1. Testimony by a Member of the Community
The traditional method of proving reputation has been to call a witness
who can testify that he is aware of the person's reputation in the commu-
nity and can testify whether the reputation is good or bad.4 3 The witness
may not testify to his personal opinion of, or knowledge about the indi-
vidual. He may only testify about what the community feels or is dis-
cussing. Because reputation is based on what is discussed in the
community, incidents that could not otherwise be considered may be ad-
mitted into evidence because the community may have relied upon them.
For example, arrests or untrue rumors, which are generally inadmissible
under the laws of evidence, can obviously be considered in establishing a
person's reputation.' On direct examination, the witness may only tes-
tify concerning his opinion of the reputation; however, particular matters
being discussed in the community may be inquired into on cross-
examination.45
This method of proving reputation is flawed because it is largely "opin-
ion in disguise."46 The testimony of the witness, although framed in
terms of reputation, actually reflects the personal beliefs of the witness
rather than the community's assessment of the individual.
2. Testimony of a Stranger
Efforts have been made to measure reputation by sending a stranger
into a community to attempt to ascertain a person's reputation. Subse-
quently, the stranger's testimony on the issue is offered. These attempts
have generally been rejected by the courts.47 Apparently, these attempts
mony "calling a lawyer a Communist would be highly injurious to professional reputation"; no
testimony that the statement harmed plaintiff's professional reputation).
43. 2 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE § 405[02] (1980) [hereinafter
cited as WEINSTEIN].
44. The price a [party] must pay for attempting to prove his good name is to throw open
the entire subject which the law has kept closed for his benefit and to make himself vulner-
able where the law otherwise shields him. The [defendant] may pursue inquiry with con-
tradictory witnesses to show that damaging rumors, whether or not well-grounded, were
afloat-for it is not the man that he is, but the name that he has which is put in issue.
Another hazard is that his own witness is subject to cross-examination as to the contents
and extent of the hearsay on which he bases his conclusion. It may test the sufficiency of
his knowledge by asking what stories were circulating concerning events, such as one's
arrest, about which people normally comment and speculate.
Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 477 (1984).
45. See M. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL. EVIDENCE § 405.1 (1981).
46. FED. R. EVID. 405 advisory committee note. See WEINSTEIN, supra note 43, at § 405[02].
47. See. e.g., Stripling v. State, 349 So. 2d 187, 192 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. denied, 359 So.
[Vol. 64:867
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have failed because there has been no showing that the stranger has taken
steps to accurately discover the reputation.48 If the trial court can be
assured that the stranger accurately measured the reputation and accu-
rately related it to the jury, the testimony should be admitted. A mem-
ber of the community, who testifies that she is aware of a person's
reputation and has heard it discussed in the community, is no more qual-
ified as an observer than is a stranger who has accurately gauged the
community's sentiments.
3. Public Opinion Surveys
Advancements in the ability to measure accurately the views and atti-
tudes of large numbers of persons have been made through the develop-
ment of polls or public opinion surveys, which are commonly used in
commerce and politics.49 A survey (or poll) is designed to study a lim-
ited number of persons, the sample, with respect to a particular matter in
order to obtain a result applicable to the entire population. A survey
records the thoughts and beliefs of the interviewees and the reasons for
those thoughts and beliefs.5" Although the Federal Rules of Evidence
recognize the admissibility of several types of reputation evidence, they
do not specifically set forth the accepted methods for proving reputation.
However, the Advisory Committee has recognized the weakness in the
traditional method of proof--calling a member of the community to tes-
tify about the person's reputation.51 There is a significant probability
2d 1220 (1978) (court rejected testimony of investigator who went into community and interviewed
five persons to determine the complainant's reputation); Commonwealth v. Baxter, 267 Mass. 591,
166 N.E. 742 (1929) (no error to exclude testimony of investigators sent into community to deter-
mine reputation of witness for truth and veracity).
48. Parker v. State, 458 So. 2d 750, 754 (Fla. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1855 (1985). In
Parker, the court refused to allow an investigator to testify to the defendant's reputation in the
cnminal justice system. "[Wl]e do not agree that the criminal justice system is either neutral enough
or generalized enough to be classed as a community or that an officer in that system is equipped to
provide an unbiased and reliable evaluation of an inmate's general reputation for truth-telling." Id.
See also Commonwealth v. Baxer, 267 Mass. 591, 592-93, 166 N.E. 742, 743 (1929) (testimony of
investigator may have relied on conversations with persons who were few in number and insignifi-
cant); State v. Miller, 72 Wash. 174, 175. 130 P. 356, 357 (1913) (testimony as to reputation was
inadmissible; inquiries by investigator in community did "not show such an acquaintance with But-
ler's reputation as to qualify Kelly to testify relative thereto .... 'All he could testify on the subject
of his reputation was what some persons. . . whom he did not know, told him it was.' ").
49. See generally 2 J. MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION §§ 32.46-32.55
(2d ed. 1984); MCCORMICK, supra note 21, at § 208.
50. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 2.712 (5th ed. 1981).
51, FED. R. EVID. 405 advisory committee note.
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that a reputation witness will testify based on his own perception, which
may not accurately reflect the community's view. Properly administered
surveys more accurately measure the existence and extent of any actual
injury to the plaintiff's reputation as a result of the publication.5 2
The decisions dealing with the admission of public opinion survey re-
sults in unfair competition53 and trademark cases,54 as well as the provi-
sions of the Federal Rules of Evidence, set forth the rationale for the
admissibility of surveys in defamation actions. In Zippo Manufacturing
Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 5 a suit was brought alleging that the defend-
ant engaged in trademark infringement and unfair competition when he
marketed copies of plaintiff's cigarette lighters. The plaintiff proffered
the results of three surveys of smokers. The surveys tended to show that
the smokers had trouble distinguishing between the plaintiff's lighters
and the defendant's copies. The trial judge established two criteria in
ruling on the question of admissibility. The first criterion was necessity,
which required a comparison between the survey's probative value and
the probative value of the evidence which could be admitted if the survey
were excluded. If the survey was more valuable, necessity was estab-
lished.56 The second criterion was reliability. Circumstantial guarantees
of trustworthiness had to surround the survey. Finding both necessity
and reliability, the Zippo court admitted the survey.
Although an objection can be made that survey results are inadmissi-
ble hearsay, surveys usually have not been excluded on that basis. Some
courts have refused to exclude surveys as inadmissible hearsay because
they are not being offered to prove the truth of what the survey partici-
pants asserted.57 Noting that surveys frequently are offered to prove the
52. It has also been suggested that public opinion surveys can be used to show whether the
public interpreted the language in question in a defamatory manner. Haller, Using Public Opinion
Surveys, 8 LITIGATION Wtr. 1982, at 17.
53. See, e.g., Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 533 F. Supp. 75 (S.D. Fla. 1981),
aff'd, 716 F.2d 854 (11th Cir. 1983).
54. See, eg., Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 830 (1976).
55. 216 F. Supp. 670 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
56. Id. at 683.
57. See Standard Oil Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 252 F.2d 65, 75 (10th Cir. 1958), holding that
survey results were admissible over a hearsay objection. The court said, "the persons who did the
interviewing testified as to the results of their surveys. Their testimony was offered solely to show
what they found. Only the credibility of the persons who took the statements was involved and they
were before the court." The court commented that if the "author" of the survey had testified as to
what the interviewers had told him, it would be hearsay. See also Scholle v. Cuban-Venezuelan Oil
[V/ol. 64:867
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truth of the survey participants' statements, other courts have held that
the admissibility of a survey depends on the sincerity of the participants'
response." However, even if the court labels the survey hearsay, the
court could admit the survey results under Federal Rule of Evidence
803(3) or 803(17), which provide hearsay exceptions for statements of
the declarant's then existing state of mind and emotion. The partici-
pant's statements to the interviewer reflect the participant's then existing
state of mind or belief.59 Thus, even if the court determines that the
survey results are hearsay, the hearsay rule will not operate to exclude
the evidence.6"
Although the "necessity" requirement set forth in Zippo has occasion-
ally been repeated without any analysis, 6 the Federal Rules of Evidence
do not require a showing of necessity as a separate prerequisite for admis-
sibility. Zippo involved the question of whether the survey was inadmis-
Voting Trust, 285 F.2d 318, 321-22 (2d Cir. 1960); United States v. 88 Cases Bireley's Orange Bever-
age, 187 F.2d 967, 975 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 861 (1951).
58. See Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Rogers Imports, Inc., 216 F. Supp. 670, 683 (1963); MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION § 2.172 (5th ed. 1981).
59. Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Wag-Aero, Inc., 741 F.2d 925, 931 (7th Cir. 1984); Randy's Stude-
baker Sales, Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 533 F.2d 510, 520 (10th Cir. 1976) (questionnaires com-
pleted by customers regarding the quality of dealership service were admissible to "reflect the then
existing state of mind of the customers as to the quality of Randy's service generally"); Holiday Inns,
Inc. v. Holiday Out in America, 481 F.2d 445, 447 (5th Cir. 1973) (in trademark infringement
action, "[t]he results of the survey conducted for Holiday Inn were admitted to show the state of
mind of people when shown a placard bearing the words 'Holiday Out' "). See generally Zeisel, The
Uniqueness of Survey Evidence, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 322, 333-37 (1960).
At least one court has indicated that the results of a survey would be admissible under Federal
Rule of Evidence 803 (24), the so-called catch-all exception. See Pittsburgh Press Club v. United
States, 579 F.2d 751, 758 (3d Cir. 1978), on remand, 462 F. Supp. 322 (W.D. Pa.) rev'd, 615 F.2d
600 (3d Cir. 1980). To be admitted under the exception, the survey must provide evidence of a
material fact, be more probative on the issue than any other evidence and have the same circumstan-
tial guarantees of trustworthiness as the other twenty-three exceptions specifically enumerated in
Rule 803.
60. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Gibraltar Fin. Corp., 694 F.2d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir. 1982), cert.
denied. 463 U.S. 1208 (1983).
61. See Toys "R" US, Inc. v. Canarsie Kiddie Shop, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1189, 1205 (E.D.N.Y.
1983). Although the second recommendation set forth in the Manual for Complex Litigation § 2.712
includes the requirement of necessity in the language of the "black-letter" recommendation, it
should be noted that in the commentary and footnotes accompanying the recommendation there is
no mention of that requirement. The 1960 edition clearly indicated that the requirement of necessity
was included so as to admit the survey under a "recognized exception to the hearsay rule." 25
F.R.D. 351, 428 (1960). The two paragraphs incorporating that discussion of the necessity require-
ment, which were included in the 1978 edition, have been omitted from the most recent 1981 edition.
Presumably, the omission by the Manual's Board of Editors was intentional. The continuing men-
tion of necessity in the Manual appears to be a drafting oversight.
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sible hearsay. The trial judge ruled that the surveys were admissible
because they were needed and reliable.62 Subsequently, the Federal
Rules of Evidence were adopted. While necessity was a factor the draft-
ers considered in determining whether particular exceptions would be
included in the Federal Rules,6" most of the enumerated hearsay excep-
tions, such as the state of mind exception, do not require counsel to lay a
foundation of necessity. Only the catch-all provisions of Rules 803(24)
and 804(b)(5) are grounded upon a predicate showing of necessity."
All evidence, whether or not it is admissible hearsay, is subject to the
weighing process of Rule 403,65 which requires the trial judge to deter-
mine whether the probative value of the survey evidence is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice or confusion of the issues.
Although the necessity for admitting certain evidence is a factor in favor
of admissibility that the trial judge may consider in applying Rule 403,66
it is not a prerequisite to admission of the evidence. In short, the Federal
Rules have not retained the necessity requirement of Zippo as a prerequi-
site to the admissibility of survey evidence, but they do not preclude con-
sideration of necessity as a factor bearing upon admissibility.
Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, the question of whether the sur-
vey is admissible hearsay is not the determinative issue. The offering
party must call expert witnesses to establish the necessary foundation
and to interpret the survey results. 6 7 Under Rule 703, an expert witness
may rely upon facts or data to support his opinion so long as they "are of
a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in forming
opinions or inferences upon the subject." The underlying facts or data
62. Judicial efficiency is increased and the costs of the parties decreased if the survey results are
admitted rather than calling as a witness each person interviewed. Moreover, a survey is the only
practical method of proving the views and beliefs of a large population.
63. See 4 WEINSTEIN, supra note 43, at § 803(17)[01].
64. The five exceptions included within Federal Rule 804(b) require that the declarant be "un-
available" as a condition precedent for the admission of the hearsay statements. The unavailability
of the declarant creates a necessity for the statements.
65. See C.A. May Marine Supply Co. v. Brunswick Corp., 649 F.2d 1049, 1055 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1125 (1981) ("Any minimal relevancy was outweighed by the likelihood that some
statements in the poll would prejudicially overemphasize Mercury's role of the 'bad guy,' a status
bearing on relationship to the sum of lost profits. We hold that the trial judge did not commit
reversible error in excluding the customer survey.").
66. See United States v. King, 713 F.2d 627, 631 (11th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 942
(1984).
67. Toys "R" US, Inc. v. Canarsie Kiddie Shop, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1189 (E.D.N.Y. 1983); 2 J.
MCCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:53 (2d ed. 1984).
[Vol. 64:867
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need not be admissible.68 Thus, the focus under the Federal Rules is not
whether the survey is hearsay, but whether the necessary foundation has
been laid-is the survey in question of a type upon which other experts in
the field would reasonably rely. In fact the drafters of the Federal Rules
of Evidence considered survey evidence specifically when they drafted
Rule 703. They commented: "The rule ... offers a more satisfactory
basis for ruling upon the admissibility of public opinion poll evidence.
Attention is directed to the validity of the techniques employed rather
than to relatively fruitless inquiries whether hearsay is involved."69
To establish the requirement of trustworthiness and reliability the pro-
ponent of the evidence must show that the survey was conducted in ac-
cordance with the accepted standards of survey research, and that the
results are being used in a statistically correct manner.7° In determining
whether the survey or poll was taken in accordance with accepted princi-
ples of survey research, the Manual for Complex Litigation suggests that
the offering party must demonstrate that the survey examined the proper
universe, drew a representative sample from that universe and employed
a correct mode of questioning with the interviewees. 71 The court also
must determine whether the techniques employed in conducting the sur-
vey are scientifically reliable.72 The scientific validity of standard survey
68. Baumholser v. Amax Coal Co., 630 F.2d 550, 553 (7th Cir. 1980).
69. FED. R. EVID. 703 advisory committee note. See Piper Aircraft Corp. v. Wag-Aero, Inc.,
741 F.2d 925, 931 (7th Cir. 1984).
70. See Baumholser v. Amax Coal Co., 630 F.2d 550 (7th Cir. 1980); Pittsburgh Press Club v.
United States, 579 F.2d 751 (3d Cir. 1978). See also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 2.712
(5th ed. 1981).
71. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 2.712 (5th ed. 1981). See also Toys "R" US v.
Canarsie Kiddie Shop, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1189, 1205 (E.D.N.Y. 1983). Section 2.712 of the Manual
for Complex Litigation also suggests that the offeror "should be required to show that the persons
conducting the survey were recognized experts; the data gathered were accurately reported; and the
sample design, the questionnaire, and the interviewing were in accordance with generally accepted
standards of objective procedure and statistics in the field of such surveys. Normally this showing
will be made through the testimony of the persons responsible for the various parts of the survey."
72. See United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1240 (3d Cir. 1985). Professor Imwinkelried
argues that, as presently drafted, the Federal Rules of Evidence require only a prima facie showing
of reliability. Imwinkelried, Judge Versus Jury: Who Should Decide Questions of Preliminary Facts
Conditioning the Admissibility of Scientific Evidence, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 577 (1984).
The existing decisions are of little help in dealing with the manner in which alleged defects in the
survey should be handled when there is an objection to the admissibility of evidence relating to it.
Many of the decisions involve trademark and unfair competition allegations which are tried to the
court without a jury. See, eg., United States v. J.I. Case Co., 101 F. Supp. 856, 868 (D. Minn. 1951)
(Trial judge sitting as the fact-finder tends to admit the evidence despite a valid objection). See 5 J.
MOORE, J. LUCAS & J. WICKER, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 38.26 (2d ed. 1985) ("It is doubt-
ful that [the survey] has any relevancy of materiality .... but the Court concludes that there is no
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technique probably has been sufficiently established to permit courts to
take judicial notice of this factor.73 Evidence of the survey should be
admitted even if the parties raise a factual issue about the manner in
which the technique was applied in a particular case. For example, the
parties may dispute whether the persons interviewed constituted a repre-
sentative sample.74 If the jury finds that the sample was not representa-
tive it can disregard the evidence. The opposing party can offer evidence
of technical defects in the survey which will go to the weight of the
evidence.75
In order to eliminate mechanical flaws in the survey as well as to avoid
unneeded expense to the parties, the trial court may be asked to make
two pretrial determinations.76 First, before the survey is conducted, the
offering party should submit the survey methodology to the court for its
consideration. Second, once the survey is completed, the underlying data
and conclusions should be disclosed to the court for a possible ruling on
need to strike the exhibit. It may remain in evidence for what it may be worth."). See also Zeisel,
The Uniqueness of Survey Evidence, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 322, 339-40 (1960) ("A court sitting without
a jury will seldom hesitate to admit a survey in evidence. The Supreme Court has never either
reversed or criticized a trial court for admitting survey evidence in a civil case tried without a
jury."). See Toys "R" US, Inc. v. Canarsie Kiddie Shop, Inc., 559 F. Supp. 1189, 1202 (ED.N.Y.
1983). Thus, in determining the admissibility of surveys during a jury trial, caution should be em-
ployed in interpreting appellate decisions suggesting that because a party failed to follow the ac-
cepted methods of conducting a survey (e.g., not selecting and examining a proper survey universe),
the survey should be "discounted," see Amstar Corp. v. Domino's Pizza, Inc. 615 F.2d 252, 264 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 899 (1980); Brooks Shoe Mfg. Co. v. Suave Shoe Corp., 533 F. Supp. 75,
80 (S.D. Fla. 1981), aff'd, 716 F.2d 854 (11th Cir. 1983), or that the defect goes to weight rather
than admissibility, see United States v. National Homes Corp., 196 F. Supp. 370 (N.D. Ind. 1961).
Many of these statements were made by trial judges sitting as factfinders. The same procedures
should be followed in determining the admissibility of surveys as is followed in determining the
admissibility of any other evidence relating to scientific techniques.
In deciding whether the survey techniques utilized have sufficient scientific reliability, the court
will apply the standard that has been adopted in that jurisdiction. See generally Giannelli, The
Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half-Century Later, 80 COLUM.
L. REv. 1197 (1980); Symposium on Science and the Rules of Evidence, 99 F.R.D. 187, 188 (1983).
The validity of the basic polling techniques seems sufficiently established so that under any of the
standards presently being discussed, the necessary reliability could be established.
73. 5 WEINSTEIN, supra note 43, at § 901(b)(9)[03].
74. Id. at §§ 901-18. Section 2.172 of the Manual for Complex Litigation appears to suggest
that if there is a dispute, the trial judge should make the factual determination that the survey
technique has been properly accomplished. That suggestion treats the admissibility of surveys differ-
ently from the admissibility of other types of scientific evidence and should not be followed.
75. See Prudential Ins. Co. v. Gibraltar Financial Corp., 694 F.2d 1150, 1156 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 463 U.S. 12-08 (1983).
76. See Union Carbide Corp. v. Ever-Ready Inc., 531 F.2d 366 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
830 (1976).
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admissibility.77 Because of the complexities involved in determining the
admissibility of both the survey and the expert testimony interpreting it,
the court should make the admissibility determination prior to trial.
In defamation actions the use of public opinion surveys can help both
parties prove more precisely a number of material issues, such as the
number of persons who were aware of the publication and the plaintiff's
reputation before and after the publication. In addition, the use of
surveys or polls that accurately assess the plaintiff's pre-and post-publi-
cation reputation may alleviate the concern that large damage awards
punish defendants rather than compensate plaintiffs for their injuries.78
III. PRESUMED DAMAGES
The common law permitted the jury, in an action for libel or certain
slanders, to award damages sufficient to compensate the plaintiff for his
loss even though there had been no proof of the existence or the extent of
the damage suffered.79 Gertz imposed a constitutional limitation on this
doctrine of presumed damages by requiring a plaintiff to prove actual
injury. However, Dun & Bradstreet subsequently reaffirmed the validity
of state defamation laws that permit recovery of presumed damages
when the defamatory statement does not involve matters of public
concern.
80
State laws permitting the recovery of presumed damages usually limit
the types of defamatory statements for which such damage are available.
In most states, plaintiffs in slander actions can recover presumed dam-
ages for four types of statements that are thought to be particularly likely
to cause actual injury.8" Although many jurisdictions have found every
libel per se actionable, and therefore presumptively damaging, some have
77. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION § 2.713, recommendation 3 (5th ed. 1981) ("The
underlying data, method of interpretation employed, and conclusions reached in polls and samples
should be made available to the opposing party far in advance of trial, and, if possible, prior to the
taking of the poll or sample."); 5 WEINSTEIN, supra note 43, at § 901(b)(9)[03].
78, See RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, at § 623.
79. See PROSSER, supra note 7, at § 112.
80. In Dun & Bradstreet, the publication was limited. Only five customers received the commu-
nication that was damaging to Greenman's credit. Nothing in the opinion limits the application of
the opinion to those facts. On the other hand, the Court has not ruled in a case involving a publica-
tion which i, wide-spread.
81. RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, at § 570. Professor Anderson has called for an end to pre-
sumed damages. See Anderson, Reputation, Compensation and Proof 25 WM. & MARY L. REv'. 747
(1984),
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limited presumed damages to intrinsically defamatory statements.82 The
reaffirmance of the propriety of presumed damages will undoubtedly re-
sult in more defamation actions being brought because a limited class of
plaintiffs will no longer have to demonstrate actual injury, regardless of
whether a negligence or strict liability standard is ultimately applied.3
In addition, even when matters of public concern are involved, presumed
damages continue to be appropriate if actual malice is demonstrated.84
A plaintiff who relies upon presumed damages asks the jury to return a
substantial verdict even though he has not introduced any evidence to
prove the existence or the extent of any damage. Juries, acting without
any real guidelines, generally determine the size of verdicts based on pre-
sumed damages." Although the concept of presumed damages provides
compensation for a plaintiff when his injury is difficult to prove, 86 the
defendant may argue that the plaintiff has not actually been injured by
the publication, and the jury should not compensate the plaintiff for
damages that have not been suffered. In anticipation or rebuttal of this
argument, a plaintiff who is entitled to rely upon presumed damages may
nevertheless decide to introduce evidence showing damage to his reputa-
tion and the extent of his injury.87 In other words, a plaintiff is not
82. RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, at § 569, comment b.
83. In actions where actual malice need not be demonstrated, it will be much easier for a de-
famed plaintiff to recover those damages regardless of whether a negligence or strict liability stan-
dard is ultimately applied. Apparently five present members of the Supreme Court would approve
state defamation laws applying a strict liability test in matters of private concern. See Dun & Brad-
street, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2953 (1985) (White, J. concurring) ("It
must be that the Gertz requirement of some kind of fault on the part of the defendant is also inappli-
cable in cases such as this.").
84. Id. at 2946 (1985).
85. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 120 (1935).
86. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2946 (1985).
87. See Augusta Chronicle Publishing Co. v. Arrington, 42 Ga. App. 746, 157 S.E. 394, 396
(1931) (evidence that a person enjoyed a good reputation was admissible in charge that was actiona-
ble per se); Johnson v. Featherstone, 141 Ky. 793, 133 S.W. 753 (1911); Tennant v. F.C. Whitney &
Sons, 133 Wash. 581, 584, 234 P. 666, 671 (1925); (in action based on slander per se, plaintiff could
introduce evidence of his good reputation in community); McCormick, Measure of Damages for
Reputation, 12 N.C.L. REV. 120, 133 (1934) (categorizes this as the "better view"). But see Conrad
v. Roberts, 95 Kan. 180, 147 P. 795 (1915) (plaintiff who had been charged with being a whore could
not offer evidence of her good reputation as part of her case-in-chief; one cannot prove what the law
presumes); 1 WIGMORE, supra note 18, at §§ 70-76 (3d ed. 1940).
Some jurisdictions distinguished between evidence offered to show plaintiff's good reputation and
evidence offered to show damage to reputation. One rule prohibited the plaintiff from introducing
evidence of his good reputation before it was attacked. A second rule forbade a plaintiff relying on
presumed damages from proving actual damages. See McCormick, Measure of Damages for Reputa.
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required to rely upon presumed damages; he may ignore them entirely
and plead and prove his actual damage.
A plaintiff may affirmatively rely upon both the theory of presumed
damages and the theory of actual damages to establish the extent of his
injury. If he chooses to rely upon both theories, he can offer evidence
during his case-in-chief establishing actual injury to his reputation result-
ing from the defamation as well as the amount of damage.88 This evi-
dence could be probative under at least two theories. First, proof of the
extent of actual injury can be offered as a guide for the jury's determina-
tion of the amount of presumed damages. While it is very difficult to
prove the dollar amount of damage to reputation, the plaintiff could ar-
gue that the proffered evidence establishes a floor for the presumed dam-
ages; at least this much damage, and probably more, has been suffered.
On a slightly different ground, the plaintiff should be permitted to
demonstrate to the jury the extent of the actual injury in order to show
that the damages actually suffered were larger than those that the jury
might reasonably expect to flow from the publication.
The plaintiff could also ask the jury to award damages on whichever of
the two theories it deems appropriate-presumed damages or actual
damages.8 9 The proof of actual injury would not be introduced to estab-
lish a floor. Instead, such proof would be an alternate method of estab-
lishing the amount of damage.
The defendant may attempt to mitigate damages by showing that the
persons who heard the publication did not believe it, or that the plain-
tiff's reputation in the community was poor before the publication.9"
Therefore, the defendant would argue, the plaintiff sustained less damage
than an ordinary citizen of good pre-publication reputation would have
tion, 12 N.C.L. REv. 120, 130-33 (1934); Anderson, Reputation Compensation and Proof, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 747, 753 (1984).
88. D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES 516 (1973).
89. Apparently, the doctrine of election of remedies does not prohibit these alternative theories
of recovery. Id. at § 1.5.
90. See Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1079 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 106 S. Ct. 182 (1985), reh'g denied, 106 S. Ct. 548 (1986) ("Evidence of a tarnished reputa-
tion is admissible and should be considered as a factor to mitigate the level of compensatory dam-
ages."); Amick v. Montross, 206 Iowa 51, 62, 220 N.W. 51, 56 (1928); Corabi v. Curtis Publishing
Co,, 441 Pa. 432, 473, 273 A.2d 899, 920 (1971); Weatherford v. Birchett, 158 Va. 741, 747, 164 S.E.
535, 537 (1932).
Other types of evidence may be admissible to mitigate damages. For example, some jurisdictions
admit evidence that the defendant was repeating what others in the community had already said.
See Corabi v. Curtis Publishing Co., 441 Pa. 432, 273 A.2d 899 (1971).
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suffered. Although some courts allow the defendant to offer evidence of
the plaintiff's general reputation, 91 other courts may limit the defend-
ant's proof to evidence of the plaintiff's reputation for the specific trait
involved in the defamation. 92 Some courts assume that statements which
adversely affect one character trait have little adverse influence on other
character traits. Under this view, the reputation evidence offered by
either the plaintiff or the defendant has to relate to the specific trait in-
volved in the defamation;93 evidence relating to other character traits
lacks sufficient probative value to be admitted. 94 Frequently, however, a
statement relating to a single trait seems to "spill over" and affect the
individual's general reputation. Thus, a defendant could persuasively ar-
gue that evidence relating to the plaintiff's general reputation should be
received.95
Occasionally, a defendant may go beyond offering evidence of the
plaintiff's poor reputation to mitigate the amount of damage suffered by
the plaintiff by electing to offer evidence to prove that a plaintiff is "libel
proof." A plaintiff is libel proof if his reputation is so poor that it is not
possible to do further damage to it. A plaintiff whose reputation is be-
yond damage will be able to recover only nominal damages for defama-
tory statements, unless the constitutional limitations prohibit even that
91. See Snively v. Record Publishing Co. 185 Cal. 565, 581, 198 P. 1, 7 (1921). Amick v.
Montross, 206 Iowa 51, 62, 220 N.W. 51, 56 (1928).
92. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 18, at § 73 ("As to the kind of repute receivable, the exclusive
admissibility of general character is no longer the law anywhere; the exclusive admissibility of the
particular trait is maintained in perhaps half of the jurisdictions, and in the others the admissibility
of both is recognized.").
93. See Snively v. Record Publishing Co., 185 Cal. 565, 198 P. 1 (1921) (defendant could prove
reputation for any character trait put in issue by the pleadings); Boyles v. Mid-Florida Television
Corp., 431 So.2d 627, 640 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983), aff'd, 467 So.2d 282 (Fla. 1985).
94. When character evidence is offered to show that a person acted in conformity with his
character, the evidence must relate to a pertinent trait and evidence of general character is usually
excluded. See Huff v. State, 437 So. 2d 1087, 1089,(Fla. 1983); MCCORMICK, supra note 21, at
§ 191.
95. See Dunagan v. Upham, 214 Ark. 66, 68, 214 S.W.2d 786, 787 (1948); Sickra v. Small, 87
Me. 493, 494, 33 A. 9, 10 (1895) (to mitigate damages defendant may introduce evidence either of
plaintiff's poor reputation as a man of moral worth or of his poor reputation with respect to that
feature of character referred to in the defamation); Yager v. Bruce, 116 Mo. App. 473, 493, 93 S.W.
307, 313 (1906) (court discusses both views and finds evidence of plaintiff's general bad reputation
for moral worth admissible, rather than limiting the evidence to the specific trait involved). Yager
also suggests that reputation for intemperance would not be admissible where statement alleged that
plaintiff was a thief. I WIGMORE, supra note 18, at § 72 (noting that most jurisdictions, rather than
allowing evidence of both specific and general reputation, "prefer to make the use of one sort
exclusive.").
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recovery. 96 When courts have recognized the libel-proof defense the evi-
dence admitted to establish that the plaintiff's reputation is beyond fur-
ther damage has been of the same nature as the specific conduct referred
to in the defamation. For example, if a defamatory statement suggested
that the defendant committed a criminal act, evidence that the plaintiff
had been involved in a multitude of other criminal activities would be
admissible.97 Apparently, the nature of the plaintiff's past actions, cou-
pled with the surrounding publicity, may be such that the plaintiff's gen-
96. For example, if a plaintiff is required by Gertz to show actual injury, he cannot recover
nominal damages.
97. See Cardillo v. Doubleday & Co., 518 F.2d 638, 640 (2d Cir. 1975). In holding the lower
court did not err in granting the defendant's motion to dismiss and motion for summary judgment in
a libel suit over a book that mentions plaintiff's participation in certain criminal acts the Cardillo
court said:
With Cardillo himself having a record and relationships or associations like these, [which
were previously listed by court] we cannot envisage any jury awarding, or court sustaining,
an award under any circumstances for more than a few cents' damages, even if Cardillo
were to prevail on the difficult legal issues with which he would be faced.
L See also Sharon v. Time, Inc., 575 F. Supp. 1162 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (court recognized that a
plaintiff could be libel proof, but found that under the facts involved with the publication, the plain-
tiff Sharon was not libel proof). In Wynberg v. National Enquirer, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 924 (C.D. Cal.
1982), the plaintiff, who had a "close personal relationship" with Elizabeth Taylor sued over an
article that appeared in the defendant's publication. The trial court granted summary judgment
partially on the basis that plaintiff was libel proof and therefore entitled to no more than nominal
damages. The court said:
Wynberg's past conduct and criminal convictions establish a bad reputation which, for
purposes of this case, render him 'libel proof' as a matter of law.... When, for example,
an individual engages in conspicuously anti-social or even criminal behavior, which is
widely reported to the public, his reputation diminishes proportionately. Depending upon
the nature of the conduct, the number of offenses, and the degree and range of publicity
received, there comes a time when the individual's reputation [for specific conduct, or his
general reputation for honesty] and fair dealing is sufficiently low in the public's estimation
that he can recover only nominal damages for subsequent defamatory statements.
Id at 927.
In Ray v. Time, Inc., 452 F. Supp. 618 (W.D. Tenn. 1976), aff'd, 582 F.2d 1280 (6th Cir. 1978),
the convicted assassin of Martin Luther King, Jr. brought suit for averments that he was a "narcot-
ics addict and peddler" as well as a "robber." The court said:
The court is persuaded, in the light of all the circumstances in this cause and in the public
record involved in the other cases mentioned, that plaintiff, James E. Ray is libel proof....
Ray, . . is a convicted habitual criminal and is so unlikely to be able to recover damages to
his reputation as to warrant dismissal of his libel claim in the light of first amendment
considerations attendant to publication of material dealing with his background and his
criminal activities.
Id. at 622 See also Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l Magazine for Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1078 (3d Cir.),
cert denied, 106 S. Ct. 182 (1985) (dicta). But see Liberty Lobby v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563, 1568
(D.C. Cir 1984), cert. denied in part. 105 S. Ct. 2672 (1985), vacated 106 S. Ct. 2505 (1986) ("Libel
proof" doctrine not recognized at summary judgment stage; "The law.., proceeds upon the opti-
mistic premise that there is a little bit of good in all of us or perhaps upon the pessimistic theory that
no matter how bad someone is, he can always be worse.").
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eral reputation is so low in the public's estimation that it is beyond
damage.98
IV. EMOTIONAL DAMAGE
Many defamation actions are the result of a person's emotional reac-
tion to having his "good name" attacked. At common law, damages for
this emotional distress were recoverable only if other special damages
were shown to have been caused by the defamation or if the statement
was actionable per se.99 If the plaintiff did not meet these predicate re-
quirements, damages for emotional distress were not recoverable even
though the defamation had caused demonstrable emotional distress.1'
Dun & Bradstreet may provide that constitutional limitations on state
defamation laws are inapplicable when a defamatory statement involves a
matter of private concern. Under this interpretation of the case, state
restrictions on the recovery of emotional damages remain intact in pri-
vate-matter cases. If these state restrictions can be overcome, a cause of
action seeking nominal damages may be available to clear the plaintiff's
name. 101
If presumed damages are appropriate, the trier of fact may presume
damages for emotional distress as well as injury to reputation.0 2 The
plaintiff does not have to introduce any evidence to support the injury
award for either element.
When the defamation involves a matter of public concern, Gertz firmly
indicates that, absent actual malice, the first amendment prohibits any
recovery unless an individual has suffered actual injury as a result of the
falsehood. Thus, in such an action, the plaintiff must plead and prove
98. See Wynberg v. National Enquirer, Inc., 564 F. Supp. 924, 928 (C.D. Cal. 1982) ("An
individual who engages in certain anti-social or criminal behavior and suffers a diminished reputa-
tion may be 'libel proof' as a matter of law, as it relates to that specific behavior.... By extension, if
an individual's general reputation is bad, he is libel proof on all matters.")
99. RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, at § 623.
100. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 794.
101. RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, at § 620. Dun & Bradstreet permits the states to generally
define the cause of action for defamation, including permitting recovery for presumed damages.
Thus, it appears that when a statement involves a matter of private concern, a state could permit a
cause of action for recovery of nominal damages. Justice White's concurring opinion in Dun &
Bradstreet suggests that a public official or public figure should have a cause of action to clear his
name when he seeks no damages. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct.
2939, 2953 (1985).
102. SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER & RELATED PROBLEMS 347 (1980).
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actual emotional damage in order to recover for the injury. 10 3 A court
probably would not recognize a cause of action seeking nominal dam-
ages, at least when public figures or public officials are involved.1"
Although the Court in Gertz said that damages for both harm to repu-
tation and mental suffering were recoverable upon a showing of the de-
fendant's fault or negligence, the Court did not discuss whether proof of
harm to reputation was required before a plaintiff could recover for
mental anguish caused by the defamation. Subsequently, in Time, Inc. v.
Firestone,t0 5 the Supreme Court affirmed a $100,000 libel judgment for
emotional damage where the plaintiff had withdrawn her claim for dam-
age to reputation before her case had been submitted to the jury. The
Firestone decision was based on a state defamation law that permitted the
recovery. The decision should not be read as a constitutional require-
ment mandating compensation for emotional injury without accompany-
ing proof of damage to reputation. Rather Firestone establishes that a
state law is not constitutionally infirm if it permits recovery of damages
for emotional distress even though no evidence of harm to reputation has
been introduced. There is nothing in the language of Gertz or Firestone
to indicate that the Court intended to convert a constitutionally pro-
tected defamation action into a constitutionally protected action for
mental distress.
In other areas of tort law, recovery for mental disturbance alone is rare
because it "is so evanescent a thing, so easily counterfeited, and usually
so trivial, that the courts have been quite unwilling to protect the plaintiff
against mere negligence." t" Courts will, however, award damages for
mental distress that flows from a physical injury. These "parasitic dam-
103. In a recent article Elmer Gertz suggested:
Especially in those situations where loss of income or loss of reputation cannot be shown
easily, counsel must make certain that the other elements of actual injury ('personal humil-
iation and mental anguish and suffering') are proved. No one is in a better position to
establish this than the plaintiff, as Gertz shows, where I testified at great length about my
'personal humiliation and mental anguish and suffering.' The plaintiff must be prepared to
respond to sharp cross-examination, which will try to minimize his injury by showing that
he consulted no physician or therapist, took no medication, lost no time at work, etc.
Counsel must not be content with general testimony in this area. If possible, the plaintiff's
testimony should be supplemented by the testimony of his family and friends. This is a
highly personalized aspect of the case. The more outrageous the defamatory statements,
the easier it will be to demonstrate, suffering, humiliation, and the like.
Gertz, Gertz on Gertz, TRIAL, Nov. 1985, at 74-75.
104. RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, at § 620.
105. 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
106. PROSSER, supra note 7, at 361.
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ages" are available when the defendant's negligence manifests itself in an
immediate physical illness or injury, such as a fractured arm. t0 7 The fact
that physical injury has resulted is thought to be sufficient to ensure that
the mental distress is real and the interference with the plaintiff's inter-
ests is significant. Often the physical harm is not immediate but flows
from the mental disturbance to the plaintiff. For example, a plaintiff may
suffer a heart attack as a result of the stress and emotional disturbance
caused by the defendant's negligence. Historically, many courts con-
fronted with such a situation required some "impact" with the person of
the plaintiff in order to ensure that the mental distress was genuine and
significant.' 018 Although most jurisdictions have abandoned the impact
requirement,10 9 they continue to deny recovery unless the emotional in-
jury has manifested itself in a physical injury capable of objective deter-
mination." 0 Thus, a plaintiff who has suffered a heart attack as a result
of emotional distress will be able to state a cause of action based upon
negligence. However, emotional injury that is allegedly caused by the
defendant's negligence but not accompanied by a physical injury or con-
sequence generally does not give rise to a cause of action."'
Even when the culpability of the defendant is greater than negligence,
such as when the defendant acts intentionally,"1 2 recovery for emotional
107. PROSSER, supra note 7, at § 54.
108. See Gilliam v. Stewart, 291 So. 2d 593 (Fla. 1974), overruled, Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d
17 (Fla. 1985); Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 413, 261 A.2d 84, 90 (1970) (Bell, C.J., dissent-
ing). PROSSER, supra note 7, at § 54.
109. For an interesting attack on the policies underlying the impact rule, see Bosley v. Andrews,
393 Pa. 161, 169, 142 A.2d 263, 267 (dissent), overruled, Niederman v. Brodsky, 436 Pa. 401, 261
A.2d 84 (1970).
110. Johnson v. State, 37 N.Y.2d 378, 383, 372 N.Y.S.2d 638, 643, 334 N.E.2d 590, 592 (1975).
See Nolan & Ursin, Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress: Coherence Emerging from Chaos, 33
HASTINGS L.J. 583, 605 (1982) ("[T]he physical injury requirement [can be viewed] primarily as a
safeguard against fraudulent claims, but that requirement could also be used to screen claims to
avoid a flood of litigation and unlimited liability."); PROSSER, supra note 7, at 362-63.
In Champion v. Gray, 478 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1985), on reh'g, 478 So. 2d 22 (Fla. 1985), the Florida
Supreme Court rejected the impact rule and permitted recovery for emotional distress against a
drunken driver who, by running his car off the road had killed the plaintiff's daughter. Plaintiff
heard the impact, ran to the scene, saw the body and, as a result of her emotional distress, collapsed
and died on the spot. However, in Brown v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., 468 So. 2d 903 (Fla. 1985), a
plaintiff was denied recovery for his emotional damage when an allegedly defectively designed accel-
erator stuck on an automobile driven by plaintiff, causing the automobile to strike and kill plaintiff's
mother. The court reasoned that, in the absence of outrageous conduct, there could be no recovery
for mental distress or psychic injury unless the plaintiff was physically injured as the result of the
defendant's negligence.
111. See Daley v. LaCroix, 384 Mich. 4, 179 N.W.2d 390 (1970); PROssER, supra note 7, at § 54.
112. RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, at § 46, comment i:
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distress is limited. Unless there is actual or threatened physical injury
and the damages are parasitic to the tort cause of action (e.g., battery),
they are not recoverable.' 1 3 To recover in an independent cause of action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the plaintiff must demon-
strate that the situation involved "extreme outrage" and that the mental
injury was "severe."' 1 4 Even if the plaintiff's mental reaction to the de-
fendant's actions is "highly unpleasant," the necessary intrusion is
lacking.' 15
When emotional distress flows from the negligent publication of a def-
amation, the courts must deal with the same concerns that are present in
ordinary personal injury actions based upon negligence. Fleeting distress
should not be compensated; one of the burdens of living in our society is
to suffer humiliation and shame as well as hurt feelings. 116 To ensure
that there has been a genuine and substantial interference with the plain-
tiff's emotions, a court should require a predicate showing of damage to
reputation."17 This requirement is similar to the other artificial predi-
The rule stated in this Section applies where the actor desires to inflict severe emotional
distress, and also where he knows that such distress is certain, or substantially certain from
his conduct. It applies also where he acts recklessly,... in deliberate disregard of a high
degree of probability that the emotional distress will follow.
113. PROSSER, supra note 7, at §§ 9-12.
114. Id. at§ 12.
115. RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, at § 46, comment j:
The rule stated in this Section applies only where the emotional distress has in fact re-
sulted, and where it is severe. Emotional distress passes under various names, such as
mental suffering, mental anguish, mental or nervous shock, or the like. It includes all
highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, em-
barrassment, anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry, and nausea. It is only where it is
extreme that the liability arises. Complete emotional tranquility is seldom attainable in
this world and some degree of transient and trivial emotional distress is a part of the price
of living among people. The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe
that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.
116. See Magruder, Mental and Emotional Disturbance in the Law of Torts, 49 HARV. L. REv.
1033, 1035 (1936) ("[A] certain toughening of the mental hide is a better protection than the law
could ever be.").
117. The jurisdictions that have addressed the issue have disagreed whether damage to reputa-
tion is essential before the plaintiff can recover for emotional damages. Compare Gobin v. Globe
Publishing Co., 233 Kan. 1, 6, 649 P.2d 1239, 1243 (1982) ("[I]n this state, damage to one's reputa-
tion is the essence and gravamen of the action for defamation. Unless injury to reputation is shown,
plaintiff has not established a valid claim for defamation, by either libel or slander.... It is reputa-
tion which is defamed... injured, [and] protected under the laws of libel and slander."); France v.
St. Clare's Hospital & Health Center, 82 App. Div. 2d 1, 441 N.Y.S.2d 79 (1981) (damage to reputa-
tion is a prerequisite to recovery of emotional damages, unless malice is present); Dresbach v.
Doubleday & Co., 518 F. Supp. 1285, 1293 (D.D.C. 1981) (injury to reputation must be proven to
recover for defamation; in invasion of privacy, emotional damage is recoverable without regard to
injury to reputation) with Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976) (Florida permits recovery of
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cates generally required for the recovery of emotional damage. The
Gertz opinion places a limitation upon the common law and should not
be interpreted as creating a cause of action in situations in which there is
neither malice nor actual injury to the plaintiff's reputation. In cases
where presumed damages are appropriate, the common-law rule, which
does not require a predicate showing of harm, should be retained and the
jury should include emotional damage within its award of presumed
damages.118 Neither policy considerations nor logic suggests that in
cases involving first amendment considerations a plaintiff should recover
for emotional distress alone while the plaintiff in a personal injury action
arising out of an automobile accident is unable to recover such damages.
V. MALICE
The state of mind of the publisher of a defamatory statement is fre-
quently the crucial question in determining whether there is liability for
the defamatory statement. The first amendment requires a public fig-
ure119 or public official12° to prove, with clear and convincing evidence,
that the defendant published the defamatory statement with knowledge
of its falsity or with a reckless disregard for its truth. This mandate has
sometimes been referred to as a requirement that the plaintiff show "ac-
emotional damages without a showing of damage to reputation); Hearst Corp. v. Hughes, 297 Md.
112, 130, 466 A.2d 486, 495 (1983) ("If such persons can convince a trier of fact that their emotional
distress is genuine and can prove the other common law and constitutionally required elements of a
negligent defamation case, we see no social purpose to be served by requiring the plaintiff addition-
ally to prove actual impairment of reputation."). See generally Anderson, Reputation Compensation
and Proof, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 747 (1984); Eaton, The American Law of Defamation Through
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc. and Beyond: An Analytical Primer, 61 VA. L. REV. 1349 (1975); PROS-
SER, supra note 7, at § 112 at 797.
Whether and when emotional damages are recoverable in a false light privacy claim is beyond the
scope of this article. See Van Alystyne, First Amendment Limitations of Recovery from the Press-an
Extended Comment on the Anderson Solution, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 793, 810-14 (1984).
118. The common law limited the recovery of emotional damages to cases in which special dam-
ages or presumed damages were appropriate. If the plaintiff did not meet these predicate require-
ments, emotional damages were not recoverable even though the plaintiff could show that the
defamation caused emotional distress. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, at § 623, comment b.
Today in most cases where actual injury was required to be proven, emotional damages are not
recoverable because the predicate of special damage is absent. Gertz should not be interpreted as
permitting the recovery of emotional damages without any predicate showing of other damages.
Such an interpretation would permit a recovery for emotional distress when the defamation involves
a matter of public concern, even though, under Dun & Bradstreet, such recovery is not allowed
when the matter is of private concern. Then the state law of defamation controls.
119. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, reh'g denied, 389 U.S. 889 (1967).
120. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
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tual malice."' 21 Apparently, the Supreme Court has extended the same
constitutional requirement to a plaintiff seeking to recover punitive
damages. 122
When actual malice is alleged, the factual issue to be decided is the
defendant's knowledge of the truth or falsity of the statement at the time
of publication. The defendant is not judged by an objective, reasonable
man standard. Instead, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant had
serious doubts concerning the truth of the publication.1 23 The Supreme
Court has not set forth a precise standard for determining the admissibil-
ity of evidence offered to prove actual malice; however, the appellate de-
cisions have relied upon a wide variety of circumstantial evidence that is
probative of the issue. Usually, the plaintiff must establish malice by the
aggregate of available proof rather than by a single item of evidence.' 24
Any evidence which is sufficiently probative of the critical element, the
defendant's state of mind, should be admissible.' 25 An extensive discus-
121. RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, at § 580A, comment d.
122. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939, 2944 (1985)
("[W]e held that a State could not allow recovery of presumed and punitive damages absent a show-
ing of 'actual malice.' ").
123. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964), overruled, Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130, 134 (1967), Alioto v. Cowles Communications, Inc., 519 F.2d 777, 779 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 930 (1975).
124. See Herbert v. Lando, 73 F.R.D. 387, 395 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("In all cases, civil or criminal,
turning upon the state of an individual's mind, direct evidence may be rare; usually the trier of the
facts is required to draw inferences of the state of mind at issue from surrounding acts, utterances,
writing, or other indicia."). In General Westmoreland's suit against CBS, his memorandum of law
in opposition to a motion to dismiss and for summary judgment filed by CBS cites legal authority for
27 different indicia of actual malice allegedly present under the facts in the record. Brief of General
William Westmoreland in Opposition to Defendant CBS's Motion to Dismiss and For Summary
Judgment at 278-307, Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 1170 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
125. See Pep v. Newsweek, Inc., 553 F. Supp. 1000, 1002-03 (S.D.N.Y. 1983); Snively v. Record
Publishing Co., 185 Cal. 565, 577, 198 P. 1, 5 (1921); Bezanson, Fault, Falsity and Reputation in
Public Defamation Law: An Essay on Bose Corporation v. Consumers Union, 8 HAMLINE L. REV.
105, 119 n.73 (1985).
Although the defendant's belief in the truth is not a defense, evidence of the belief may be consid-
ered by the injury on the issue of malice. See Gray v. Allison Division, General Motors Corp., 52
Ohio App. 2d 348, 356, 370 N.E.2d 747, 753 (1977).
Similar questions involving the mental condition of the defendant arise when the action involves
express malice, which provides a basis of punitive or exemplary damages, or the type of malice which
destroys one of the many common-law qualified privileges. Although some courts define the malice
that defeats the claim of qualified privilege in terms of actual malice, see Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc., 680 F.2d 527, 535 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983), many states have broad-
ened the definition to include relevant circumstances that would support a conclusion that the de-
fendant acted in "an ill-tempered manner or was motivated by ill-will" and other circumstances that
would support a determination that the privilege was abused. Sondorf v. Jacron Sales Co., 27 Md.
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sion of the evidence that both parties may offer on the issue of actual
malice is beyond the scope of this Article. However, the three types of
evidence discussed elsewhere in this Article: reputation testimony, opin-
ion testimony and evidence of a party's specific actions are among the
types of evidence admissible to prove actual malice. Evidence of specific
actions that is probative of the statement's truthfulness is relevant to
prove the defendant's state of mind if it is shown that the defendant was
aware of those acts before the publication of the statement.126 Obviously,
events that occurred after the publication and actions of which the de-
fendant was unaware are not probative of the defendant's state of mind at
the time of publication. The plaintiff also may offer evidence of the de-
fendant's actions that are relevant in demonstrating the defendant's
doubts concerning the truthfulness of the publication.'27
App. 53, 341 A.2d 856 (1975). See PROSSER, supra note 7, at § 115. Most states also require an
additional showing for a plaintiff to recover punitive damages, regardless of the type of action in-
volved; i.e., punitive damages can be recovered only if the defendant acted with ill will, evil motive or
a conscious disregard of the interests of another; what has been termed "express malice." Id. at
§§ 2, 34. Although cases dealing with express malice and qualified privilege are not controlling
authority in determining actual malice in the constitutional sense, they are persuasive in determining
the admissibility of evidence concerning the defendant's state-of-mind since all three types of cases
involve that issue.
126. See Cowman v. LaVine, 234 N.W.2d 114, 121-22 (Iowa 1975); cf Swan v. Thompson, 124
Cal. 193, 56 P. 878 (1899) (where qualified privilege is asserted, evidence is admissible to show that
defendant's "mental state was one of good faith without malice or ill will."); Jones, Varnum & Co. v.
Townsend's Adm'rix, 21 Fla. 431, 449 (1885) (evidence of statements made by third parties to de-
fendant concerning the truth of the defamatory statement were admissible to show defendant's state
of mind; claim for exemplary damage and defense of qualified privilege); Holdaway Drugs, Inc. v.
Braden, 582 S.W.2d 646, 650 (Ky. 1979) (evidence received by defendant from Internal Revenue
Service, even though erroneous, was relevant to whether the defendant believed defamatory state-
ment was true; claim of qualified privilege).
When evidence is offered to prove the defendant's state of mind, it is not offered to prove the
plaintiff's character or that the plaintiff acted in a particular manner. Thus, the restrictions on
admissibility contained in Federal Rules of Evidence 404 and 405 do not apply. The only issue is
whether the proffered evidence is sufficiently probative of the defendant's state of mind at the time of
the publication. No specific provision in the Federal Rules of Evidence affects the analysis of admis-
sibility for that purpose.
127. See Green v. Northern Publishing Co., Inc., 655 P.2d 736 (Alaska 1982), cert. denied, 463
U.S. 1208 (1983) (the fact that the defendant disregarded certain evidence may be admissible to
prove actual malice); Sprouse v. Clay Communication, Inc., 158 W. Va. 427, 431, 211 S.E.2d 674,
680, cert. denied, 423 U.S. 882 (1975) (evidence that newspaper "joined with political partisans in an
overall plan or scheme to discredit the character of a political candidate" admissible to prove actual
malice). Cf Harley-Davidson Motorsports, Inc. v. Markley, 279 Or. 361, 374, 568 P.2d 1359, 1366
(1977) (evidence of specific actions of the defendant admitted to show express malice); McBurney v,
Times Publishing Co., 93 R.I. 331, 338, 175 A.2d 170, 174 (1961) (statements by defendant subse-
quent to publication admissible to show malice to defeat claim of privilege).
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Evidence of the defendant's ill-will or bad feeling toward the plaintiff is
relevant not only to show the appropriateness of punitive damages, but
also to establish an inference of actual malice.' 28 Similarly, evidence of
the plaintiff's reputation in the community which is probative of the
truth of the defamatory statement may help to prove the defendant's
state of mind at the time of the publication if it is also shown that the
defendant was aware of that reputation.12 9 In addition, community
members' opinions about the truth or falsity of the statement would be
probative of the publisher's state of mind if he had knowledge of those
opinions.
VI. TRUTH OR FALSITY
When a public official or a public figure alleges that he has been de-
famed, the first amendment requires that he prove that the defendant
published the defamatory statement with knowledge of its falsity or with
reckless disregard for the truth or falsity. Thus, such a plaintiff must
offer evidence of the falsity of the statement as well as evidence of the
state of mind of the defendant. 3° Apparently, the falsity of the state-
ment is an element of the constitutionally defined cause of action.13 ' The
plaintiff cannot wait to introduce evidence of falsity until after the de-
fendant's case; such a failure will probably lead to the granting of the
defendant's motion for a directed verdict.
In Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps,132 the Supreme Court ex-
tended the first amendment requirement that placed the burden of proof
for the issue of falsity upon the plaintiff to private persons seeking dam-
ages from media defendants for the publication of statements concerning
public matters. The Court held that when the evidence of truth or falsity
is ambiguous, a news organization should not be penalized for statements
that may be true even though victims of false statements may be denied
recovery.
128. Cochran v. Indianapolis Newspapers, Inc., 175 Ind. App. 548, 372 N.E.2d 1211 (1978); see
also RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, at § 580A, at 218.
129. Cf Coogler v. Rhodes, 38 Fla. 240, 245, 21 So. 109, 111 (1897) (evidence of general reputa-
tion "tended to show good ground for suspicion of the truth of the matters alleged to be false"); Van
Derveer v. Sutphin, 5 Ohio St. 294, 299 (1855).
130. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1974); Meiners v. Moriarity, 563 F.2d 343, 351
(7th Cir. 1977) (defendant may offer evidence that the statement is true, "but such an offer does not
cause the burden to shift to him").
131. Herbert v. Lando, 441 US. 153, 176 (1979).
132. 106 S. Ct. 1558 (1986).
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When the plaintiff is a private person and the publication involves a
matter of private concern, few of the constitutional limitations apply, and
state defamation law controls.' 33 The common law,' 34 which was incor-
porated into the defamation law of most states, 135 presumed that defama-
tory statements were false 136 and required the defendant to plead and
prove the truth of the statement. 137 Under this view, the truth or falsity
of the statement was not in issue until the defendant raised it., 38 Because
evidence offered to prove an inconsequential fact is generally inadmissi-
ble 139 a plaintiff could not offer evidence, during his case-in-chief, of his
good character to prove the falsity of the statement.'4 The falsity of the
statement simply was not a contested issue in the suit. However, some
jurisdictions provided that if the defendant pled truth, otherwise known
as justification, the plea placed the issue in controversy in the suit. In
jurisdictions allowing the justification defense, the plaintiff could antici-
pate the defense and introduce evidence of the falsity of the statement
during his case-in-chief.' 4 1
Whether a defendant could offer evidence in support of the published
statement without pleading justification also proved a troublesome issue
for the courts. In jurisdictions that restricted the defendant's proof of
falsity to situations in which justification had been pleaded, 4 2 courts up-
133. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2939 (1985).
134. See Franklin, The Origins and Constitutionality of Limitations on Truth as a Defense in Tort
Law, 16 STAN. L. REv. 789, 790-805 (1964); Ray, Truth: A Defense to Libel, 16 MINN. L. REV. 43
(1931).
135. See PROSSER, supra note 7 at 116. Compare Denny v. Hertz, 106 Wis.2d 636, 318 N.W.2d
141, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 883 (1983) (defendant must prove truth) with Jadwin v. Minneapolis Star
and Tribune Co., 367 N.W.2d 476, 491 (Minn. 1985) (private plaintiff must prove that defendant
knew or should have known that the statement was false).
136. Vigil v. Rice, 74 N.M. 693, 699, 397 P.2d 719, 723 (1964); PROSSER, supra note 7, at § 116,
at 841.
137. Gray v. Allison Division, General Motors Corp., 370 N.E.2d 747, 753 (Ohio Ct. App.
1977) (the defendant's belief in the truth is not a defense, it may be considered on the issue of the
defendant's malice).
138. RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, at § 581A, comment b ("truth is an affirmative defense
which must be raised by the defendant ... ").
139. 2 WEINSTEIN, Evidence, supra note 43, at § 401[03]. Cf Bauman v. Volkswagenwerk Ak-
tiengesellschaft, 621 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1980).
140. See Dame v. Kenney, 25 N.H. 318, 324 (1852) (Although evidence of plaintiff's good char-
acter is not admissible until attacked, plaintiff's evidence was admissible to disprove the charges
imputed to her by the slander because the defendant had opened the door.); Severance v. Hilton, 24
N.H. 147, 148 (1851) ("Where the defendant has not attacked the plaintiff's general character in
evidence, the plaintiff cannot introduce proof of his good character to rebut a justification.. .
141. See Harding v. Brooks, 22 Mass. 244, 246-47 (1827).
142. See Krulic v. Petcoff, 122 Minn. 517, 519, 142 N.W. 897, 898 (1913).
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held the restriction as a means of avoiding the plaintiff's objection of
unfair surprise. 14
3
Two developments have diminished significantly the rationale for state
defamation law restrictions on the proof of truth or falsity. First, the
constitutional requirement that certain plaintiffs prove falsity as a part of
their respective causes of action obviously mandates permitting each
plaintiff to introduce evidence to prove the issue; all parties are alerted to
the fact that falsity will be an issue during plaintiff's case-in-chief. A
similar result is reached under the defamation law of those states that
require every plaintiff to prove falsity as a part of his cause of action. In
the majority of jurisdictions, which place the burden on the defendant,
the availability of extensive pretrial discovery and the requirement of pre-
trial disclosure of claims and defenses provide a means of making the
parties aware that falsity will be a contested issue whether or not the
defendant has asserted a separate defense of justification.
Most defamatory statements involve derogatory assertions concerning
the plaintiff's character. 144 Character is defined "as the kind of person
that one is' 145 and includes not only whether a person is chaste or honest
but also such matters as whether a person is a competent driver or a
criminal. Although Federal Rule of Evidence 404 severely restricts the
use of evidence of a person's character, the Rule's prohibition is limited
to situations in which the evidence is offered as circumstantial evidence
of the manner in which the person acted on a particular occasion. Rule
404 does not forbid the use character evidence for some other purpose.
In a defamation case, when the truth or falsity of the statement is being
established, Rule 404 usually does not apply because neither party is re-
lying upon the existence of a particular trait to supply the basis of an
inference that the plaintiff acted in accordance with that trait on a spe-
cific occasion. Rather, both parties are seeking to establish an element of
the cause of action-whether the alleged defamatory statement asserting
that the plaintiff has a particular character trait is true or false. The
plaintiff's character itself is in issue. The Advisory Committee Note to
Rule 404 recognizes the inapplicability of the Rule to situations in which
character is an element of a claim or defense. When character is an issue,
no question of the relevancy of the character evidence exists. 1
46
143 See I WIGMORE, supra note 18, at § 207.
144. MCCORMICK, supra note 21, at § 187, at 551.
145. FED. R. EvID. 404 advisory committee note.
146. Id.
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Regardless of which party offers evidence to prove the truth or falsity
of a defamatory statement or which party bears the burden of proof, the
same considerations should apply in determining if the proffered evi-
dence is admissible. The Federal Rules of Evidence do not draw any
distinctions between the permissible methods for proving that the allega-
tion is true.147 In addition to permitting the use of evidence of specific
instances of the plaintiff's conduct, Rule 405 permits the truthfulness to
be proved or disproved by testimony concerning the plaintiff's relevant
reputation and by testimony in the form of an opinion as to whether the
statement is true. The application of Rules 401148 and 403 149 limits the
use of evidence which has a tendency to prove or disprove the truth of
the statement; such evidence will not be considered by the finder of fact
when its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
undue prejudice and confusion of the issues. Although the Federal Rules
do not speak directly to the problem of proving truth or falsity, the fore-
going provisions generally embody the principles of the common law re-
lating to the proof of character, and there is little reason to believe that
the application of these principles will produce a different result, except
as otherwise noted.
When the defamatory statement alleges that the plaintiff has commit-
ted a specific act (e.g., "X robbed the First National Bank"), only evi-
dence which shows that the plaintiff had or had not engaged in that
specific activity is admissible. Evidence that the plaintiff had committed
other similar acts (e.g., other bank robberies) does not have sufficient
probative value to overcome the prejudice and confusion of issues that
would result if such evidence were admitted.' Similarly, proof of a
statement which alleges that the defendant committed a series of acts
must be of the same scope as the acts mentioned in the statement.' 5 ' If
the defamation is of a general character (e.g., "X, the bank robber .... ),
evidence that the plaintiff has committed similar acts (e.g., bank robber-
147. See MCCORMICK, supra note 21, at § 187.
148. FED. R. EVID. 401 defines "relevant" evidence.
149. FED. R. EvIo. 403 allows the exclusion of relevant evidence when its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues and waste of time.
150. See Crane v. New York World Telegram Corp., 308 N.Y. 470, 475, 126 N.E.2d 753, 756
(1955); Vorhees v. Toney, 32 Oki. 570, 573, 122 P. 552, 554 (1912); Roper v. Mabry, 15 Wash. App.
819, 823, 551 P.2d 1381, 1384 (1976); SACK, LIBEL, SLANDER AND RELATED PROBLEMs 38 (1980).
Evidence of specific acts of the plaintiff may be relevant to prove the motive for the defendant to
do the act alleged. See Holdaway Drugs, Inc. v. Braden, 582 S.W.2d 646 (Ky. 1979).
151. F. HARPER & F. JAMES, LAW OF TORTS § 5.20 (1956).
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ies) has sufficient probative value to be admitted to prove the truth of the
charge.'52 However, evidence that the plaintiff has committed criminal
acts other than bank robberies is not admissible because such evidence
does not have any significant tendency to prove the truth of the general
allegation. 53 Wigmore suggested that the reason for limiting the evi-
dence to the specific charges in the statement was to prevent the abuse
and surprise that would occur if the plaintiff had to meet evidence "rang-
ing over his entire life."' 54
In order to prove the truth of the defamatory statement, a party may
offer evidence of the plaintiff's character in the form of report, rumor or
reputation. Rumors and suspicions concerning the truthfulness of the
statement itself are excluded, probably because the probative value of
rumors to prove truth or falsity may be slight while the danger of preju-
dice is high.'55 Although courts and commentators disagree about
whether falsity can be proven by evidence of the plaintiff's reputation for
good character,156 Rule 405(a) generally permits the use of such evi-
dence.157 However, the reputation evidence must be probative of the spe-
cific defamatory matter published by the defendant. For example, if the
actionable statement is that the plaintiff "robs banks," evidence that the
plaintiff has a reputation for robbing banks would be admissible to show
that the statement was true. However, evidence that the plaintiff has a
reputation for being an untruthful person would lack sufficient probative
value to be admissible. Courts should also exclude reputation evidence
when it is too broad. Evidence that the plaintiff has a reputation in the
community for being of "good character" does not have adequate proba-
tive value to prove that he did not "rob banks" as alleged in the state-
ment. Although a plaintiff should not be allowed to introduce such
152 See Krulic v. Petcoff, 122 Minn. 517, 520, 142 N.W. 897, 898 (1913); Croft v. Thurston, 84
Mont. 510, 519, 276 P. 950, 953 (1929); Lawson v. Morning Journal Ass'n, 32 App. Div. 71, 73, 52
N.Y.S 484, 485 (1898); 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 143, at 300 (1985).
Proof of specific acts subsequent to the publication may be admissible on the issue of truth. See
Moore v. Davis, 16 S.W.2d 380, 383 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929), aff'd, 27 S.W.2d 153 (Tex. Com. App.
1930).
153. RESTATEMENT, supra note 21, at § 581A, comment f.
154. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 18, at § 207.
155. Nicholson v. Rust, 21 Ky. 645, 52 S.W. 933 (1899). See generally Cooper, Libel and the
Reporting of Rumor, 92 YALE L.J. 85 (1982).
156. 1 WIGMORE, supra note 18, at § 66 (observing that while there are "plausible arguments"
on both sides of the issue and it is natural that laws of the "various jurisdictions should differ," the
defendant should not be entitled to offer evidence of the plaintiff's bad character to prove his guilt).
157. MCCORMICK, supra note 21, at § 187.
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evidence to prove the falsity of the statement, a court could allow such
evidence as proof that the plaintiff's reputation has been damaged by the
defamation.
Limiting the scope of reputation testimony to the nature of the defam-
atory charge is not consistent with the treatment of specific acts offered
to prove the truth of the defamatory statement or with the treatment of
character evidence offered as circumstantial evidence. Character evi-
dence is admitted only when it pertains to a pertinent character trait;
general character evidence is excluded.15 The limitation avoids preju-
dice and confusion of the issues.
Rule 405(a) also permits the use of relevant opinion testimony., 59 The
defendant could offer testimony of an expert witness who had concluded,
after adequate investigation, that in his opinion the plaintiff was a bank
robber.160 Opinion testimony is not objectionable simply because it goes
to an ultimate issue. As is the case when character is proved by reputa-
tion or evidence of specific instances of conduct, the opinion testimony
must be as specific as the charge in the defamatory statement. For exam-
ple, if the publication concerns the commission of a specific act (e.g., that
plaintiff robbed the First National Bank), the opinion would have to re-
late to that specific charge. Evidence that the plaintiff had committed
other robberies or had a reputation as a bank robber should not be
admitted.
VII. CONCLUSION
The recent affirmance of the constitutional validity of presumed dam-
ages, and possibly of the other elements of a common-law defamation
action involving a private person and a statement concerning a private
matter, calls for a reevaluation of each of those elements in light of mod-
em evidentiary policy. Such cases, particularly those involving media
defendants, are tried with increasing frequency to a jury because of the
absence of the constitutional privileges.
The truthfulness of the publication is an important issue regardless of
158. See United States v. Greer, 643 F.2d 280, 283 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 854 (1981);
Huff v. State, 437 So. 2d 1087, 1089 (Fla. 1983). See also MCCORMICK, supra note 21, at § 191;
FED. R. EvID. 404.
159. MCCORMICK, supra note 21, at § 187.
160. Prior to the Federal Rules, many jurisdictions excluded opinion testimony which was of-
fered to prove the truth of the defamatory statement. See McDuff v. Detroit Evening Journal Co.,
84 Mich. 1, 10, 47 N.W. 671, 673 (1890).
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whether the plaintiff is a public official or a private person. The courts
must be attentive to the techniques used to prove this issue to ensure that
prejudice and confusion of the issues are not injected into the trial.
The concern that juries will use concepts such as presumed damages
and emotional distress to punish the media or unjustly award damages
because there is no method to assess accurately a monetary value for
either element, 1 6 is a concern that has been urged vigorously and loudly
in other areas of tort law for a number of years. Defendants in both
medical malpractice and product liability suits have been faced with the
same problem, only more frequently and with much larger jury verdicts.
The cries of outrage and the expensive campaigns mounted by manufac-
turers and doctors have gone largely unnoticed in the court system.
There is little likelihood that defamation defendants will be more
successful.
This Article makes two suggestions that should help insure that only
actual losses are compensated. First, although properly conducted pub-
lic opinion surveys cannot establish a precise dollar amount for the loss
suffered by the plaintiff, they can provide persuasive and accurate evi-
dence of both the fact and the extent of injury.
Second, to insure that the defamatory statement has significantly inter-
fered with the plaintiff's emotions, 162 state defamation law should treat
emotional damages in the same way that it treats emotional damages in
other tort causes of action. State law should require a predicate showing
161. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 262, 267, 277 (1964); Anderson, Reputation,
Compensation and Proof, 25 WM. & MARY L. REv. 747, 755-56 (1984); RESTATEMENT, supra note
21, at § 327; A. Lewis, The Sullivan Case, NEW YORKER, Nov. 5, 1984, at 94-95.
162. The year after the article defaming Elmer Gertz was published, his law practice earned
more than it had in any previous year and he was elected a delegate to the Illinois Constitutional
Convention. Although he suffered no physical symptoms or manifestations, lost no time from work
and sought no medical or other professional help as a result of his outrage and distress, the jury
awarded $100,000 to compensate him for his emotional damage. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 627
F,2d 527, 531 (7th Cir. 1982). The jury also awarded Gertz $300,000 in punitive damages. Gertz
used a portion of the proceeds to finance a lengthy cruise for himself and his wife.
No one testified that Gertz's reputation was damaged and Gertz failed to name any person who
thought less of him as a result of the article. Gertz attempted to prove damage to his reputation
during his second trial. "Several attorneys testified at trial that calling a lawyer a Communist would
be highly injurious to professional reputation. One witness, Albert Jenner, testified that he had
heard the defamatory statements about Gertz repeated." Id. at 540. Elmer Gertz's emotional dis-
tress might not have been sufficient by itself in any tort action other than defamation.
This information concerning the second Gertz trial was provided by Mr. Gertz. E. Gertz, Re-
marks to First Amendment Seminar, Florida State University College of Law (Oct. 23, 1984) (video-
tape available in Florida State University College of Law Library).
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to ensure that the emotional damage is substantial and genuine. In cases
where presumed damages are not appropriate, the plaintiff should be re-
quired to demonstrate damage to reputation as a predicate for recovery
of emotional damages. If both suggestions are adopted, questionable jury
verdicts can be avoided.
In weighing the conflicting policies in defamation cases, emphasis is
again being placed upon the state's interest in compensating its citizens
for wrongful injury to their reputations. In today's environment, many
important questions in defamation actions can be resolved properly only
if courts recognize that the issues involved are a part of the general tort
framework; it is unrealistic to believe that all questions relating to defa-
mation can be solved solely within a constitutional structure.
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